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1 Introduction
Spillovers of locally provided public goods to neighbouring municipalities are prominently
assumed in many theories of public goods provision (Brainard and Dolbear (1967), Boskin
(1973), Etro (2006)). If local public goods are substitutes, then these spillovers imply
that local expenditure for public goods will be lower when such expenditure is high in
nearby municipalities. This has been shown empirically to be the case, for instance, by
Sole´-Olle´ (2006) or Hanes (2002). In other words, local governments benefit from their
population being able to use public goods provided by neighbouring municipalities. This
spillover of public goods provision is socially beneficial if each municipality by itself would
be too small as to provide these public goods at an efficient scale.
However, opportunities for spillover of public goods do not always exist: Neighbouring
municipalities may be separated from each other geographically by water or mountains
or politically by country borders on which trade barriers are imposed. In such a case,
the costs imposed on the local community by the lack of public goods spillover is an
important piece of information for political decisions such as the construction of bridges
or tunnels, or the establishments of regional economic hubs that span both sides of a
country border. The immediate effect of a small region’s separation from neighbouring
regions is that its citizens cannot use public goods provided by other local authorities,
or only at a significant cost. As a consequence, the local government will either provide
this good at a lower-than-efficient scale, or choose not to provide it. Hence, this physical
separation will result in higher costs of public goods provision or social welfare loss caused
by its underprovision. The aim of this paper is to develop a framework to quantify the
loss to such an isolated region resulting from the foregone public goods spillovers.
The empirical analysis proceeds in four steps: In the first step, we use panel data
from 205 municipalities in England, Scotland and Wales over a period of 10 years to
estimate the impact of the municipalities’ own characteristics, its neighbouring munici-
palities’ characteristics and public expenditure, and the distance to these neighbouring
municipalities on municipalities’ public expenditure. Consistent with the above argument
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of substitutability of local public goods, municipalities spend less if public expenditure in
neighbouring municipalities is high. However, our results also point at a cost of proximity
to other municipalities: If neighbouring municipalities are more populous, public goods
may become overcrowded, so that the local government will have to spend more on them.
Hence, it is not a priori clear which of these effects will dominate, i.e. whether being part
of a contiguous area would make the geographically separated municipality spend more
or less than it actually does.
The second step is, therefore, to use the estimation results from the first step to
predict how much more or less such a geographically separated municipality would spend
if it wasn’t separated. We use the Isle of Wight as a particular example for such a
geographically separated municipality and predict how much it would spend on public
goods were it attached to the mainland by normal road and rail connections. Making
plausible assumptions on the perceived distance to its next neighbours, we find that
optimal expenditure of the Isle of Wight would be about a sixth less if it was connected
with the neighbouring municipalities by normal road and rail connections compared to
the actual geographical situation.
Third, we will quantify the overall social loss for the Isle of Wight resulting from
being detached from the mainland. As noted above, a remote municipality may decide
not to provide certain goods or services at all rather than providing it at an inefficient
scale. As our analysis in the second step is only concerned with expenditure, it would not
capture such an effect, so that we would underestimate the impact on the Isle of Wight
when confining our analysis on that part only. Hence, we use a simple theoretical model
of decision making by local governments in order to show how the parameter estimate
of grants can be used to quantify the income effect on a municipality’s optimal public
goods provision. Using this effect and the previously obtained prediction of the impact
of remoteness on expenditure, we can then quantify how much more budget the Isle of
Wight would need such that its citizens can consume the same amount of private and
public goods as if it was part of the mainland, which we estimate to be about a quarter
of its actual expenditure.
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Last, we acknowledge the strategic nature of local governments’ public expenditure
choices. As public goods provided by neighbouring municipalities are substitutes to each
other, local governments prefer their neighbours to spend more on public goods so that
they can free ride on their neighbours’ public expenditures and spend less themselves. In
Section 5, we will argue informally that the strategic effect countervails the direct effect
that we estimate for the Isle of Wight in Section 4, but only to a negligible extent.
Public expenditure spillovers have been analysed extensively in the literature, with
different results depending on the level of observations, the nature of local public expendi-
ture and the definition of neighbourliness. For instance, state governors have theoretically
been argued to be concerned about migration of the tax base and benefit claimants as
well as yardstick competition between state governments, all of which predict a positive
correlation between public expenditure in similar, not necessarily adjacent states, which
is confirmed by Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) and Baicker (2005).
Alternatively, expenditure spillovers may reflect public goods spillovers. Due to the
importance of geographical distance, studies that are concerned with this issue use
municipality-level data and spatial weights based on geographical distance. However,
whether the goods and services paid for with these expenditures are substitutes or com-
plements is an empirical question: For instance, Hanes (2002) for rescue services in
Sweden and Sole´-Olle´ (2006) for total spending in Spain have obtained results that are
consistent with local public goods being substitutes, whereas Murdoch, Rahmatian, and
Thayer (1993) for recreation expenditures in the Los Angeles region and Costa, Veiga,
and Portela (2015) for total spending in Portugal find a positive coefficient for spatially
lagged expenditure, which is in line with complementarity between local public goods.
We focus on local public goods spillovers and, therefore, use municipality-level data, and
find support for substitutability of local public goods. It will turn out that this substi-
tutability simplifies the theoretical model and, therefore, identifying the effect that we
are interested in.
As another line of related literature there are a number of policy papers on Pacific
Island Countries and the impact of their small scale and isolation on issues such as
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public financial management (Haque, Knight, and Jayasuriya (2015)) or growth and
vulnerability to shocks (Becker (2012) and Tumbarello, Cabezon, and Wu (2013)). None
of these papers analyse the costs of forgone public goods spillover.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we use a well-known model of public
expenditure spillovers to motivate the regression analysis and extend this model to de-
rive the impact of remoteness on public goods provision as a function of the parameter
estimates that are going to be obtained in the regression. Section 3 discusses the vari-
ables used in the regression and explains the construction of the spatial weight matrices.
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, and Section 5 adds a discussion of free-riding
and strategic choice of local public expenditure. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple Theory of Public Expenditure Spillovers
Determinants of Regional Public Expenditure We will consider a slightly simpli-
fied version of the model in Sole´-Olle´ (2006) to analyse the impact of a municipality’s
characteristics on optimal local public expenditure. Let us suppose that social welfare
Vi(xi, zi) in municipality i is a quasi-concave function of per-capita public goods provision
zi and per-capita spending xi for a composite private good. Furthermore, the amount
of public goods zi that each citizen of municipality i has at her disposal is a function of
several characteristics of municipality i, including a linear, positive relationship with mu-
nicipality i’s per capita public goods expenditure ei. More specifically, let zi = Zi + εei,
where Zi denotes that part of zi that is invariant to ei (because it depends on other
characteristics of i).
Furthermore, assume that the per-capita income after central taxes, and including
grants from the central government, in municipality i is yi. Hence, i will choose ei so as
to maximize Vi(yi− ei, zi(ei)). Assuming that dV (yi,Zi)dei > 0, the optimal choice e∗i satisfies
the first-order condition
− ∂Vi(yi − e
∗
i , zi(e
∗
i ))
∂xi
+ ε
∂Vi(yi − e∗i , zi(e∗i ))
∂zi
= 0. (1)
Hence, the impact of a determinant ai of i’s public goods provision on the optimal choice
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of ei is given by the comparative statics of (1),
∂ei
∂ai
= −ε
∂2Vi(yi−e∗i ,zi(e∗i ))
∂z2
− ∂2Vi(yi−e∗i ,zi(e∗i ))
∂x∂z
Ω
∂zi
∂ai
, (2)
where Ω is the term that the second-order condition for a local maximum requires to be
negative. Hence,
sgn
(
∂ei
∂ai
)
= −sgn
(
∂zi
∂ai
)
. (3)
as long as the composite private good is a normal good.
Following Sole´-Olle´ (2006), we shall also argue that zi depends on the municipality’s
characteristics in the following ways: Ceteris paribus, more public goods provision in a
neighbouring municipality and lower costs of the own and the neighbouring municipali-
ties’ public goods provisions will increase the public goods zi at municipality i’s citizens’
disposal for given per capita expenditure ei by i and its neighbours. However, a larger
population in municipality i and a larger ratio of neighbouring municipalities’ to the own
municipality’s populations will overcrowd the public good and, thus, reduce a represen-
tative citizen’s consumption of it. For all of these characteristics, (3) implies that the
effect on ei will have the opposite sign than what we have just argued for zi.
It is important to note that the aforementioned assumption on how i’s expenditure
depends on public goods provision in neighbouring municipalities is implicitly based on
an assumption that public goods provided by i and its neighbours are substitutes, for
which the regressions in Section 4 will lend empirical support. Intuitively, we assume
that public goods spillovers just impact on the amount of public goods available for
municipality i’s citizens.1 Note that, while our empirical specification that will be set
out in the following two paragraphs is independent of this assumption, our approach
of quantifying the welfare costs of foregone spillovers that we develop thereafter cannot
1By contrast, complementarity of neighbouring municipalities’ public goods may mean that higher
public good provision in a neighbouring municipality makes public goods provision in this municipality
more effective, so that the marginal effect of local public expenditure in the own municipality on public
goods provision increases in the neighbouring municipality’s public goods provision. Alternatively, local
governments may not know the optimal quantity of public goods and, therefore, use neighbouring mu-
nicipalities’ choices of public goods provision as benchmark. As the appropriate theoretical model would
depend on the specific source for the complementarity, we confine the analysis to the case of substitutes.
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be used for complementary public goods spillovers since we would erroneously interpret
the positive correlation between neighbouring municipalities’ expenditures that we would
observe in this case as negative externalities.
In addition to these characteristics that affect public goods consumption for given local
public expenditures, but not social welfare directly, there may also be characteristics bi
that directly impact on Vi. In this case, the comparative statics analysis yields
∂ei
∂bi
= −ε
∂2Vi(yi−e∗i ,zi(e∗i ))
∂z∂b
− ∂2Vi(yi−e∗i ,zi(e∗i ))
∂x∂b
Ω
. (4)
For instance, if bi represents a preference parameter that expresses the representative
citizen’s taste for consumption of public rather than private goods, then a higher bi will
increase ∂Vi
∂z
relative to ∂Vi
∂x
, so that we expect this parameter’s impact on i’s equilibrium
expenditure to be positive. Alternatively, bi may represent the public budget of munici-
pality i. If both the public and the composite private good are normal, i will spend more
on both goods, which means that ei will increase.
To sum up, the theoretical analysis presented above suggests that several characteris-
tics of a municipality and spatial lags of some characteristics determine this municipality’s
choice of per capita expenditure. In Section 4, we will, therefore, estimate the following
equation
ei =α0 + α1
∑
j
wijej + α2Ni + α3N
2
i + α4
∑
j kijNj
Ni
+ α5ui + α6mi + α7ri + α8ti + α9gi + α10wagei
+ α11
∑
j
wijuj + α12
∑
j
wijmj + α13
∑
j
wijrj,
(5)
where Ni is municipality i’s population size, K = (kij) is a spatial weights matrix in which
kij = 0 if the distance dij between i and j is at least 50 miles, and kij = d
−1/2
ij otherwise,
and W = (wij) is the row standardized version of K. The shares ui of unemployed, mi
of non-UK migrants and ri of residents of rural areas in the population collectively serve
as proxies for cost of public goods provision. Furthermore, we will control for local tax
ti, per capita grants gi and wage income wagei to account for the municipality’s budget
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constraint. Last, we include the spatial lags of the aforementioned proxies for costs of
public goods provision, unemployment, migration and urbanisation. This specification
follows Sole´-Olle´ (2006) to a large extent.
Quantifying Costs of Foregone Spillover We will now explore a way of identifying
the costs that an isolated municipality bears, ceteris paribus, compared to a hypothetical
case in which it is connected with its next neighbours. Let d′ij denote the distance
between i and j in the hypothetical situation of contiguity that we are interested in. In
our empirical application, in which i is an island, even the ’actual’ distance dij is not
straightforward to determine: Unless there are road or railway bridges, a given distance
to the mainland will be significantly more costly and time consuming to travel than the
same distance on land. Furthermore, the spatial lags of per-capita variables in (5) are
computed using a row-standardaized spatial weights matrix, which is appropriate for the
case of contiguous regions but cannot account for remoteness.
We will tackle this issue by defining the i-th rows of K and W based on the hypo-
thetical distances d′ij and discounting them by a factor λ that accounts for the time and
costs that it takes to get from i to the mainland. Hence, our notion of remoteness is
similar to iceberg transportation costs known from the trade literature. If travelling from
the island i to the mainland costs more time and money than travelling 50 miles on the
mainland, the appropriate value for λ would be zero.
Let Ai denote the vector of spatial lags used in the estimation (5), based on the hy-
pothetical spatial weight matrices. This vector includes the spatial lag of the endogenous
expenditure variable, which means that we analyze municipality i’s optimization problem
for given expenditure choices of neighbouring municipalities. We will discuss this assump-
tion below in Section 5. If α is the vector of estimated coefficients for these spatial lags,
the estimation of (5) predicts the impact of these spatial lags on i’s actual local public
expenditure to be λαAi. We will write e
o
i (·) to denote i’s optimal expenditure choice as
a function of this impact of the spatial lags. For instance, the actually observed level of
expenditure in i is equal to eoi (λAi).
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We seek to identify the extra budget that i would need to provide the same level
of public goods that its residents would have at their disposal if i was connected with
its neighbours without compromising private goods consumption, i.e. the difference e˜−
eoi (λAi), where e˜ is defined formally by
zi(e˜, λAi) = zi(e
o
i (Ai), Ai). (6)
The first step is to use the regression results to predict eoi (Ai), i.e. the per capita ex-
penditure that i would spend if it was connected to the mainland. Furthermore, we can
rewrite (6) so as to be able to use the parameters that we are going to estimate in the
empirical exercise: (6) is equivalent to
zi(e˜, λAi)− zi(eoi (λAi), λAi) = zi(eoi (Ai), Ai)− zi(eoi (λAi), λAi). (7)
which, due to the fact that zi is linear in ei, is equivalent to
e˜− eoi (λAi) =
1
ε
∫ Ai
λAi
(
∂zi(e
o
i (A˜), A˜)
∂e
∂eoi (A˜)
∂A˜
+
∂zi(e
o
i (A˜), A˜)
∂A˜
)
dA˜ (8)
= αAi(1− λ) + 1
ε
∫ Ai
λAi
∂zi(e
o
i (A˜), A˜)
∂A˜
dA˜ (9)
The first summand on the right-hand side of (9) is the difference eoi (Ai)− eoi (λAi) =
αAi(1 − λ) between predicted optimal local public expenditure in the hypothetical sit-
uation that i is connected to its neighbours, and the actually observed local public ex-
penditure. This takes account of the ’indirect’ effect of connectedness on public goods
consumption via the change in optimal local public expenditure. Note that we expect
this to be negative since typically the benefit from neighbouring municipalities using each
others’ public goods outweighs potential costs of congestion due to scale effects. Hence,
the availability of more public goods spillover will induce i to spend less than it actually
does.
As we observe eoi (λAi) and have just argued that we can predict e
o
i (Ai) using our
regression results, it remains to identify the second summand on the right-hand side of
(9), which measures how connectedness directly impacts on public goods consumption
for given local public expenditure. This is potentially problematic since our estimation
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will neither deliver the impact ε of local public expenditure nor that of the spatial lags
Ai on local public goods consumption directly. However, the following proposition shows
how these impacts can be obtained in a simple way from parameters that our estimation
does deliver.
Proposition 1 Define γ :=
∂eoi
∂yi
. Then,
1
ε
∂zi(e
o
i (A), A)
∂A
=
(
−1− γ
1− γ
)
∂eoi (A)
∂A
(10)
Proof. The second total differential of Vi(·) is
Ω = ε2
∂2Vi(yi − e∗i , zi(e∗i ))
∂z2
− 2ε∂
2Vi(yi − e∗i , zi(e∗i ))
∂x∂z
+
∂2Vi(yi − e∗i , zi(e∗i ))
∂x2
(11)
Using (2), we have
1
ε
∂zi(e
o
i (A), A)
∂A
= −1
ε
ε2 ∂
2Vi
∂z2
− 2ε ∂2Vi
∂x∂z
+ ∂
2Vi
∂x2
ε∂
2Vi
∂z2
− ∂2Vi
∂x∂z
∂eoi (A)
∂A
=
(
−1− γ
1− γ
)
∂eoi (A)
∂A
,
where the last equality is obtained using the comparative statics with respect to yi:
γ =
∂e
∂yi
=
∂2Vi
∂x2
− ε ∂2Vi
∂x∂z
ε2 ∂
2Vi
∂z2
− 2ε ∂2Vi
∂x∂z
+ ∂
2Vi
∂x2
(12)
= 1− ε ε
∂2Vi
∂z2
− ∂2Vi
∂x∂z
ε2 ∂
2Vi
∂z2
− 2ε ∂2Vi
∂x∂z
+ ∂
2Vi
∂x2
. (13)
Intuitively, removing municipality i’s physical separation is like reducing the price
for public goods, as i’s citizens can consume more public goods for given local public
expenditure. In this sense, Proposition 1 yields the total effect of this ’price reduction’
on public goods consumption by disentangling it into a substitution effect and an income
effect: The cheaper availability of public goods due to the intensified spillover after the
removal of physical separation causes the municipality to substitute some private goods
consumption with more public goods consumption. However, its citizens will also feel
richer due to the cheaper availability of public goods. This income effect can be obtained
using the parameter for an exogenous change in i’s budget in the estimation of (5). In
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the empirical exercise carried out in Section 4, we will use the parameter of government
grants in order to obtain the effect γ of such an exogenous budget change on optimal
local public expenditure.
With Proposition 1, (9) becomes
e˜− eoi (λAi) = −αAi(1− λ)
γ
1− γ . (14)
Recall that we have argued above that we expect αAi to be negative, so that the extra
amount of local budget that i would need to achieve the same levels of consumption as in
the hypothetical case where it is connected with the mainland is expected to be positive.
3 Data
Observations Our dataset is comprised of 205 British municipalities, each with an own
local public expenditure budget at its disposal. More specifically, these are all Unitary
Authorities,2 Shire Counties, London Boroughs and Metropolitan Districts in England,
Council Areas of Scotland and Principal Areas of Wales. We follow these observations
over a period of 10 years, from 2007-08 until 2016-17.
Variables Table 1 presents an overview of all variables used in the empirical analysis
and their summary statistics. The dependent variable, Expenditure, is defined as the
difference between total local public expenditure and expenditure for fire and rescue and
police, since these areas are often provided in cooperation between two municipalities.
The sources for these variables are the Department for Communities and Local Govern-
ment, StatsWales and the Scottish Local Government Finance Settlement.
Among the independent variables, there is a set of population-related variables, all
of which have been obtained from 2011 census of the Office for National Statistics: In
addition to the total population count this set includes the shares of non-UK migrants
2with the exception of the Isles of Scilly, which we excluded due to their extraordinarily small popu-
lation and, as a consequence, the fact that the claimant count data was not reported for confidentiality
reasons. Excluding this observation is standard in the literature on local public expenditure in England;
see, for instance, Moscone, Knapp, and Tosetti (2007).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics.
Please enter Table 1 about here.
and the rural population3 in total population, and a proxy for the local unemployment
rate which is calculated as the share of claimants for unemployment benefits in the total
population. Furthermore, wage income is defined as mean weekly gross pay and obtained
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.4 Last, the average Band D equivalent
council tax per household and the total specific and special revenue grants and revenue
support figures used to calculate grants per capita are obtained from the Department for
Communities and Local Government.
Spatial Weights The spatial weights matrices are based on simple beeline distances
between the post codes of the municipalities’ townhalls. We use these distances dij to
create the spatial weight matrix K = (kij) where
kij =
{
d
− 1
2
ij , if 0 < dij ≤ 50;
0, otherwise.
(15)
and the row standardized matrix W = (wij) where
wij =
kij∑
j kij
. (16)
For the municipalities in our dataset that are located on the British mainland, we simply
use these spatial weights. However, we have also a number of island municipalities in
our dataset. As discussed in the theoretical analysis, the beeline distance from an island
is usually much more costly and time consuming to travel than the same distance on
the mainland. Almost all island municipalities in our dataset are so remote that all of
their spatial weights are zero anyway, with the exception of the Isle of Wight, in which
case the above definition of the weights matrix would overestimate the spillovers from
3For Scotland, this variable has been obtained from the National Records of Scotland.
45 missing years for the City of London have been interpolated based on its 5 existing observations
and all observations of this variable in all other municipalities.
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neighbouring municipalities. Hence, it is important to create a realistic set of weights for
the Isle of Wight.
For the hypothetical case that the Isle of Wight was not separated from the mainland,
we will use the i-th rows of K and W as defined above using the beeline distances. In
order to account for the physical separation, we first calculate the ’perceived’ distance
from the Isle of Wight to the mainland, taking into account the higher costs of transport,
the lower speed of travel over water and the additional time required for boarding: For
instance, the car ferry requires arrival at least 30 minutes before the scheduled sailing
time, whereas the means of transport has to be changed twice when travelling from some
train station on the Isle of Wight to another train station on the mainland. We define
the perceived distance as the distance that costs the same amount of money and time
to travel on land as it costs to travel from the Isle of Wight to the mainland, taking the
average of the time-based and the cost-based calculations. In Appendix A we compare
the time and money required for the cross-Solent travel to travelling on the mainland and
propose a perceived distance of 31.5 miles for a train journey and more than 69.6 miles
for a car journey.
In a next step, we use the actual width of the Solent (5 miles) to calculate the difference
d˜ between the perceived and the beeline distance between the Isle of Wight and the
mainland. When accounting for this difference in the weight matrices, the problem arises
that it would have little impact on the row standardized matrix W . Hence, we will
discount the Isle of Wight’s row and column in the weights matrix by a factor λ which
is decreasing in the difference between the perceived and the actual distance, does not
change the weight matrices if this distance is zero (i.e., λ = 1 in this case) and removes
all spillovers from neighbours if this difference is above 50 miles. A factor that satisfies
all these requirements is λ = max
{
1− d˜
50
, 0
}
. We will use the factor λ = 1− 26.5
50
= 0.47
based on the train journey in the main regression and the quantification of the costs of
foregone spillovers proposed in equation (14). Furthermore, we will provide the same
regressions and calculations for the factor λ = 0, which is appropriate for a car journey,
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as a robustness check.5
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we seek to quantify the extent to which a remote municipality could
reduce its local public expenditure in the hypothetical case where it does have close-
by neighbours, and use this prediction to quantify the monetary equivalent of the total
welfare effect using the formula developed in Section 2. To get an impression of this
effect of remoteness on local public expenditure, Table 2 lists per capita local public
expenditure on the Isle of Wight along with that on the mainland municipalities within
50 miles distance. Per capita expenditure in most of the mainland municipalities in Table
2 is between £1,000 and £1,200, whereas that on the Isle of Wight is almost £1,500.
Table 2: Per Capita Local Public Expenditure, 2016-17.
Please insert Table 2 about here.
Of course, this difference cannot serve as a serious estimate of the island effect, as these
municipalities are very different in many other ways beyond the geographical location
on or off the mainland. Therefore, we analyse our panel data of 205 municipalities
in England, Scotland and Wales to estimate the effect of public expenditure spillovers
and predict how much lower the Isle of Wight’s public expenditure would be if it was
connected to the mainland. As the method that we propose in Section 2 is based on
an out-of-sample prediction for the remote municipality in the hypothetical case of no
physical separation, for which we need to estimate coefficients of time-invariant variables,
we will use random effects specifications throughout, and account for any unobserved
region-specific and time-specific heterogeneity by including region and year fixed effects
5Note that our method for calculating the perceived distance is only based on the travel time, but
not on uncertainty which might further make travelling to and from the Isle of Wight less attractive. In
this sense, our weight of λ = 0.47 represents the upper and that of λ = 0 the lower bound of the spatial
weights for the Isle of Wight when taking into account its detachedness from the mainland.
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in all regressions.6
We start with a very simple specification that entirely ignores the spatial dimension
of the data but, instead, seeks to capture the effect of remoteness in a single dummy
variable. This dummy variable Island / Remote is equal to one for all municipalities that
are entirely detached from the mainland, which are, in our dataset, the Isle of Wight, the
Orkney Islands, the Shetland Islands and the Outer Hebrides. Furthermore, the Scottish
Council Areas of Argyll and Bute, and Dumfries and Galloway, are (mainly) located on
the main island of Great Britain but so remote that the nearest neighbouring council seat
is more than 50 miles away, so that we included them in this category.
The results of this regression are presented in the first column of Table 3. The pa-
rameter estimates are plausible and in line with the theory and the existing literature:
Increases in council tax income or grants increase the budget and, thus, imply an increase
in public spending. In addition to that, Sole´-Olle´ (2006) controls for personal income in
order to close the budget constraint on the individual level. For our units of observation,
the weekly wage income is observed and has the expected positive coefficient. Further-
more, the variables unemployment, non-UK migrants and share of rural population are
supposed to proxy for costs of public goods provision. Intuitively, larger costs force the
municipality to increase public goods expenditure for a given amount of public goods
provided. However, there is a countervailing effect that optimal public goods provision
will go down as a result of the cost increase. In this sense, the positive parameters of
the share of non-UK migrants and the unemployment rate indicate that the first effect
dominates for these variables, whereas the effects seem to balance out for the share of
the rural population.
The parameter that we are mainly interested in is the coefficient for the island / re-
moteness dummy, which indicates that the six remote municipalities in our dataset spend,
6In particular, the greater autonomy that the UK countries (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland) achieved in 1999 within the process of ‘devolution’ caused fundamental differences in the way
in which the UK countries are funded and, thus, public expenditure is determined (see, for instance,
Pickernell and Mcgovern (2002), Heald and Short (2002) or Andrews and Martin (2010)), which our
region fixed effects account for.
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Table 3: Local Public Expenditure in Great Britain.
Please insert Table 3 about here.
on average, about £633 per capita more in local public expenditure than their connected
counterparts, after controlling for the aforementioned variables as well as region and time
fixed effects. However, this estimate is unlikely to be accurate as it ignores the extent
to which expenditures from the closest neighbours would spill over if the gap between
them could be bridged. In order to address this shortcoming, we estimate a spatial panel
model based on Kapoor, Kelejian, and Prucha (2007), using an estimator developed by
Lee and Yu (2010) based on the assumption that the random effects follow the same spa-
tial autoregressive process as the idiosyncratic errors. As usual for spatial autoregressive
models, the reverse-causality problem that a municipality’s own expenditure has a similar
impact on its neighbours’ expenditure choice as vice versa, and spatial autocorrelation of
error terms are corrected for.
The results from these regressions are presented in the remaining columns of Table
3. Following Sole´-Olle´ (2006), we use the weight matrix K for the spatial lags of the
population and its square and the row standardized weight matrix W for all spatial lags
of per capita variables (and the spatially autocorrelated error term). Note that the Isle
of Wight is included in the regressions, but we have set all weights to λKi and λWi as
explained in Section 3.
The regression in the second column is our main regression, in which we assume
λ = 0.47, which is in line with the perceived distance of the Isle of Wight from its
mainland neighbours when travelling by train. The impacts of the municipalities’ own
cost and budget variables are qualitatively similar to the panel regression in the first
column discussed above. The most important insight of this regression is the negative
coefficient of the spatial lag of the dependent variable, local public expenditure. In other
words, higher public expenditure in neighbouring municipalities induces a municipality
to reduce its expenditure. This is consistent with the aforementioned argument that
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some of the public goods provided in the near proximity will spill over to citizens of a
given municipality, so that this municipality will reduce its own public expenditure in
order to achieve the optimal mix of consumption of private and public goods. Similarly,
a larger population in neighbouring municipalities will make a municipality’s own public
goods more congested and, thus, induce it to spend more, as evidenced by the positive
coefficient of the spatial lag of the population size.
We also controlled for the spatial lags of the cost-related variables unemployment,
migration and rural population. Intuitively, a neighbouring municipality’s higher cost
of providing public goods reduces public goods provision for given public expenditures,
which might induce the municipality under consideration to increase its own public ex-
penditure. On the other hand, however, these problems may spill over directly and affect
this municipality’s cost of providing their own public goods. The negative coefficients of
the spatial lags of unemployment and migration lend support to the latter argument.
Given our analysis in Section 2, it is straightforward to use these parameter estimates
to calculate the costs of geographical separation for a municipality. First, based on the
2016-17 data, we predict the impact of increasing the Isle of Wight’s spatial weights λKi
and λWi to Ki and Wi, respectively, which, by equation (9), yields e
o
i (Ai) − eoi (λAi) =
αAi(1−λ) = 251.40 per capita, which we display in the bottom row of the second column
in Table 3. In other words, the Isle of Wight would spend £251.40 less per capita on
public goods if it was connected to the mainland, which is about 17.1% of its actual
expenditure of £1,470.36 per capita.
As argued earlier, this difference is just the optimal reaction of the local government to
geographical separation but does not take into account the social costs of lower consump-
tion over all due to the ’income effect’. Hence, in line with the analysis in Section 2, we
multiply this difference by the factor γ
1−γ , where γ is the impact of an exogenous change
in the local government’s budget on its expenditure choice. Using the parameter estimate
for grants per capita to approximate γ, we get, for the second column, γ
1−γ =
0.6029
0.3971
to
obtain the full effect of geographical separation, which is £381.69 per capita. Hence, we
conclude that, according to our measure of social costs, the Isle of Wight’s costs of geo-
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graphical separation from the mainland and, thus, lack of public goods spillover, amounts
to about 26.0% of its actual public expenditure. This figure can be interpreted in the
context of Table 2, as our measure of the cost of the Isle of Wight of foregoing public
goods spillovers from neighbouring municipalities is roughly in the order of magnitude of
the unconditional average difference in public expenditure between the Isle of Wight and
nearby municipalities on the mainland.
As a robustness check, the third column repeats this exercise for the case where
λ = 0, which serves as an upper bound of the island effect where the Isle of Wight
has no immediate neighbour at all in terms of a perceived distance below 50 miles.
This regression yields similar qualitative results as that in the second column, with the
predictions of the effect of remoteness on the Isle of Wight being higher than in the
respective regression with λ = 0.47.7
A potential objection against our empirical result is that the random-effects estimator
is only unbiased if the independent variables of the model are uncorrelated with unobserv-
able time-invariant characteristics of municipalities. In situations like ours where fixed-
effects specifications cannot be used as they do not deliver estimates of time-invariant
variables, an alternative to the Hausman test is to follow Mundlak (1978) by including,
for each unit of observation (i.e., each municipality in our case), the means of each time-
variant variable over time as additional control variables to the random-effects regression.
If these additional control variables, the ’Mundlak Terms’, are jointly significant, the in-
dependent variables are correlated with some unobservable time-invariant characteristics,
so that the original random-effects estimator is biased. In that case, the auxiliary regres-
sion that include the Mundlak Terms, referred to as the ’correlated random effects’ model,
delivers unbiased estimates.8
When adding the Mundlak Terms to our main regression in the second column of
Table 3, these terms are indeed jointly significant (p < 0.01). Hence, we present the
7Our results are also qualitatively robust to an alternative specification that includes the remoteness
dummy as an additional control variable.
8See Wooldridge (2010, p. 332). Debarsy (2012) discusses applying this method to spatial panel data.
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results for the correlated random effects model in the fourth column. Most results,
including the predicted hypothetical impact for the Isle of Wight of being connected
to the mainland displayed in the last row of the table, are qualitatively confirmed. A
notable difference is that the estimated coefficient for Grants is now below 0.5, so that
the factor γ
1−γ =
0.3500
0.6500
is now below 1, and the full effect of geographical separation
of the Isle of Wight is smaller than the predicted reaction of local public spending to
that separation. Intuitively, by controlling for all municipality-specific characteristics,
the correlated random effects estimator purely relies on within-unit variation of grants,
i.e., it measures how municipalities react to changes in the budget over time. However,
as a prudent local government may realise that such a change may only be temporary
and, thus, only react cautiously to such a change, the effect estimated in this way may
be much smaller than how that local government would react to a permanent change in
the budget, which seems the more appropriate thought experiment in the case of an out-
of-sample prediction like ours where we are interested in a permanent counterfactual. In
this sense, the correlated random effects estimation may provide a lower and the standard
random effects regression an upper bound to our proxy for the income effect, which differ
according to the extent to which the impact of different budgets across municipalities are
included in the estimate.
5 The Strategic Effect
The estimation of (5), the results of which were displayed in Table 3, included a causal
estimate of the impact of neighbouring municipalities’ expenditures on a municipality
i’s choice of expenditure, correcting for the reverse causality problem of i’s expenditure
having an impact on its neighbours’ expenditure choices. We can, therefore, interpret the
predictions of our regression to represent a municipality’s choice of expenditure for given
expenditure choices of neighbouring municipalities. That is to say, the specification (5)
explicitly measures the strategic effect of each municipality making its expenditure choice
as an optimal reaction to neighbouring municipalities’ expenditure choices. The negative
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parameter estimate for the spatial lag of expenditure supports the view that own and
neighbours’ expenditures are substitutes, i.e., that municipalities that can rely on their
neighbours to spend more will cut down on their own expenditures.
This kind of free riding on neighbouring municipalities’ expenditures creates a strate-
gic conflict: All municipalities would prefer their neighbours to spend more on public
goods and services in order to permit themselves to spend less. The most widely ac-
cepted solution concept for such strategic conflicts (games) is the Nash Equilibrium,
which, in our case, requires that each municipality’s choice is its best reply to all other
municipalities’ choices. Assuming that the observed expenditure choices are optimal given
the municipalities’ objective functions, the regression equation (5) can be interpreted as
municipality i’s best-reply curve as a function of expenditures in neighbouring regions,
and the parameter of the spatial lag of expenditure, multiplied with the spatial weights
matrix, as this best-reply curve’s slope.
The solid lines in Figure 1 display the Isle of Wight’s and Southampton’s predicted
expenditure choices, based on the regression estimates from Table 3, as functions of each
other, assuming that all other municipalities’ expenditure choices are exogenously given
on the levels observed in our dataset. The Nash Equilibrium, where both municipalities’
expenditure choices are best replies to each other, is where these lines intersect. As we
have used our regression results to specify the best-reply curves, both municipalities’
expenditures in Nash Equilibrium are those predicted by the regression.
Figure 1: Please insert Figure 1 about here.
For the exercise of predicting the Isle of Wight’s expenditure in the hypothetical situa-
tion where it is connected with the mainland, we kept all other municipalities’ expenditure
choices constant and only changed the Isle of Wight’s spatial weights. This change in
the spatial weights changes the slope of the Isle of Wight’s best reply curve, making its
expenditure more respondent to its neighbours’ expenditures. Furthermore, the curve’s
intercept changes as the spatial lags of the exogenous variables are affected, too. These
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changes are reflected in the dashed line in Figure 1, which is again based on the parameter
estimates in Table 3. The resulting change in the Isle of Wight’s expenditure that we had
presented in the previous Section is, then, the horizontal distance between both curves,
measured from the old equilibrium, along the horizontal dotted line in Figure 1.
The equilibrium analysis reveals that this figure was just an approximation of the total
effect that we can expect when making the Isle of Wight contiguous with the mainland.
Taking into account the full strategic effect will affect this result in the following two
ways: First, the Isle of Wight’s neighbours will react to the change in the Isle of Wight’s
expenditure. As the Isle of Wight spends less, Southampton, for instance, will spend
more, which will, in turn, induce the Isle of Wight to spend even less. The resulting
new Nash Equilibrium is where Southampton’s best-reply curve intersects with the Isle
of Wight’s new, dashed best-reply curve.
Second, Southampton will also benefit from increased public goods spillovers from
the Isle of Wight. That is to say, Southampton’s spatial weight for the Isle of Wight’s
expenditure and exogenous variables for which spatial lags are included in the regression
will also increase. Hence, moving to a situation where the Isle of Wight is connected
to the mainland will also change the slope and the intercept of Southampton’s best-
reply curve. This new dashed curve is added to the diagram displayed in Figure 2. The
total equilibrium effect for the Isle of Wight’s expenditure change due to the change
in the spatial weights matrix is the horizontal distance between the intersection of the
dashed lines and the intersection of the solid lines. Figure 2 shows that, in our case, that
intersection is below the dotted horizontal line, so that the strategic effect constitutes a
tiny, almost negligible countervailing effect to the direct effect identified in Section 4.
Figure 2: Please insert Figure 2 about here.
In general, whether the total equilibrium effect is much different than the partial
effect derived in Section 4 and, if so, whether it is larger or smaller, depends on various
factors: First, if the exogenous variables for which the parameter estimates of the spatial
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lags in our regression are positive (such as the population relative to Southampton’s)
are large, or the exogenous variables with a negative parameter estimate for the spatial
lags are negative (such as unemployment) are small on the Isle of Wight, this will make
the effect on the intercept of Southampton’s best-reply curve more positive. Second, if
Southampton’s spatial weight of the Isle of Wight is large, this will amplify that effect on
the intercept, and the (always negative) effect on the slope of the best-reply curve. As
Southampton has quite some neighbouring municipalities whose weights do not change,
some of which are closer by than the Isle of Wight, the row-standardized weight of the
Isle of Wight in Southampton’s row in the weights matrix is rather small (just about 7%).
By contrast, this hypothetical change affects all of the Isle of Wight’s spatial weights, so
that the slope of the Isle of Wight’s best-reply curve will be much more affected than
that of Southampton’s.
6 Conclusion
We have estimated a model of public expenditure spillovers using panel data from 205
municipalities in England, Scotland and Wales, and obtained parameter estimates that
are consistent with spillovers of local public goods that are substitutes for each other.
Within a simple theoretical model of spillover of substitutable public goods, we showed
that the extra budget that a geographically separated municipality would need to provide
the same level of public goods as it would if it was not separated can be quantified using
our parameter estimates. As an illustration, we performed this exercise for the case of
the Isle of Wight and found that it would cost the Isle of Wight about a quarter of its
actual current public expenditure to fund the level of public goods at its citizens’ disposal
if public goods spillovers were available.
Our proposed approach can yield valuable information for political decisions in a
number of scenarios beyond the case of the Isle of Wight used for illustrative purposes
in this paper: For instance, Norway has an abundance of islands separated from the
mainland, opposite banks of fjords separated from each other, or municipalities on both
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sides of a steep mountain range, the Nordryggen. Similarly, some country borders form,
to some extent, barriers to economic interactions between municipalities on both sides
of these borders, the most extreme cases being borders that separate countries with
radically different political systems such as that between South and North Korea. In
these scenarios, the quantification of social costs of the lack of public goods spillover as
obtained by our approach can deliver two sets of insights: First, saving these costs of
separation would be an important benefit of investing in overcoming this separation by
building bridges or tunnels or by establishing free movement between countries. Second,
if such an investment is infeasible or impossible, this figure hints at what amount of
support a municipality needs from central government to guarantee fair funding across
regions.
On a more general account, our result of significant public goods spillovers implies
that there are externalities of local public expenditure choices, which might be resolved
by central intervention. For instance, our estimation suggests that neighbouring munic-
ipalities’ public expenditures are substitutes for each other, which gives rise to a free
rider problem. In this case, coordination of local expenditure decisions by the central
government may be welfare enhancing.
In line with the estimation results, our formula to translate the estimated impact
of geographical separation on local public expenditure into its welfare costs is based on
the assumption that public goods provided in neighbouring municipalities are substi-
tutes to each other. This simplifies identification because we can disregard the way in
which public goods spillovers impact on marginal benefits of own public goods provision.
However, since this latter effect is crucial when public goods provided by neighbour-
ing municipalities are complements, our approach cannot be readily used for the case
of complementarity. Furthermore, if the mix of public goods financed by municipalities
in our dataset include substitutes and complements, we are likely to underestimate the
cost of lack of public goods spillover. In this sense, we would see our quantification as a
conservative estimate for these costs.
Last, it needs to be emphasized that our analysis focuses on the social costs of a lack of
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local public goods spillovers due to physical separation. However, physical separation is
likely to have an effect on many other relevant economic activities such as the consumption
of private goods or the flow of production factors between regions. These issues are beyond
the scope of this paper and need to be addressed within suitable frameworks such as a
computable general equilibrium model.
Appendix
A Calculation of the Isle of Wight’s Perceived Dis-
tance
In this Appendix, we calculate the ’perceived’ distance of the Isle of Wight from the
mainland.
For the case of a train journey, we compare the time and costs that it takes to get to
London from a train station on the Isle of Wight that is located in close proximity to the
shore (’Ryde Esplanade’), using the fast catamaran to cross the Solent, and the time and
costs that the same journey would take if it started at the first station in Portsmouth
(’Portsmouth Harbour’). The beeline distance between these stations is 5 miles. On
a typical working day, the first journey is scheduled to take 144 minutes, whereas the
latter only takes 94 minutes. Since the beeline distance between Portsmouth Harbour
and London Waterloo Station is about 65 miles, our measure for the ”perceived” distance
from the Isle of Wight to the mainland based on the travel time is about 65∗50/94 = 34.6
miles.
Where the extra cost are concerned, the first trip costs £47.20 one-way, whereas
exactly the same train from Portsmouth Harbour would cost £33.40. Based on this
measure, the perceived distance is 65 ∗ 13.8/33.4 = 26.9 miles. Taking the average of the
time-based and the cost-based measure yields a perceived distance equal to 31.5 miles.
For a car journey, we compare a journey from Ryde to Portsmouth and an equally
long and costly onward journey on the mainland. It takes about 10 minutes to get to the
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Ferry terminal in Fishbourne, drivers are required to be there 30 minutes ahead of the
booked sailing, and the crossing itself takes about 40 minutes. 110 minutes by car will
take a traveller from Portsmouth, for instance, to Eastbourne (beeline = 61.5 miles) or
Poole (beeline = 39.1 miles). As for costs, a typical car ferry ticket for a normal passenger
car costs about £45. Using the HMRC approved mileage rate of £0.45, this amount of
money would get a traveller 100 miles on land by car. Hence, even the most conservative
estimate of the perceived distance as the average of the time-based and the cost-based
calculations would be (39.1 + 100)/2 = 69.6 miles.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per Capita Expenditure (£1,000) 1.8949 1.1138 0.7479 26.2145
Population 300,697.4000 250,399.1000 7,338 1,541,893
Wage income 608.8351 123.4113 395.2 1,582.8
Unemployment 3.0126 1.5233 0.4 8.8
Non-EU migrants 0.0248 0.0357 0.0018 0.1474
Share of Rural in Total Population 20.7131 25.2340 0 100
Household Council Tax 1,211.1290 167.7826 377.00 1,694.66
Per Capita Grants 1.4605 0.6307 0.4041 7.5594
Table 2: Per Capita Local Public Expenditure, 2016-17.
Municipality Per Capita Local Public Expenditure
Isle of Wight £1,470.36
Bournemouth £931.33
Hampshire £1,157.34
Poole £1,090.98
Portsmouth £1,194.84
Southampton £1,354.96
West Sussex £1,159.51
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Table 3: Local Public Expenditure in Great Britain.
Panel Model Spatial Autoregressive Panel Models
‘Fixed Island Factor’ λ = 0.47 λ = 0 λ = 0.47
Population -1.9719*** -0.1053 -0.1168 0.3931
(0.4398) (0.2620) (0.2652) (3.4234)
Population2 1.1763*** 0.1272 0.1435 -0.5734
(0.3026) (0.1779) (0.1800) (1.5830)
Unemployment rate 0.0530** 0.0680*** 0.0633*** 0.0572
(0.0246) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0359)
Non-EU migrants 7.0789*** 2.5564*** 2.6169*** 2.4634***
(1.4070) (0.8663) (0.8765) (0.7946)
Grants 0.8030*** 0.6029*** 0.6112*** 0.3500***
(0.0436) (0.0441) (0.0443) (0.0509)
Household Council Tax 0.0010*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0013***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Wage Income 0.0019*** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0011*
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Rural 0.0008 0.0016* 0.0014 0.0009
(0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Island / Remote 0.6333***
(0.1981)
Population (spatial lag) 0.1581*** 0.1573*** -0.2573***
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0623)
Unemployment rate (spatial lag) -0.1104*** -0.0919** -0.1054*
(0.0418) (0.0411) (0.0566)
Non-EU migrants (spatial lag) -4.2716** -3.0787 -2.9124
(2.0222) (1.9767) (1.7931)
Rural (spatial lag) 0.0022 0.0022 0.0036*
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020)
Spatial lag of dependent variable -0.2165*** -0.2094*** -0.1119
(0.0572) (0.0570) (0.0731)
Spatially autocorrelated 0.4722*** 0.4682*** 0.3686***
part of error term (0.0460) (0.0465) (0.0660)
σu 0.3216 0.1525 -0.1562 0.1174
σe 0.5282 0.5212 0.5216 0.5132
χ2 1111.3977 3237.4842 3156.9291 4373.3566
χ2 (spatial terms) 157.6437 151.8179 65.8880
Overall R2 0.5836
Pseudo R2 0.7479 0.7467 0.7681
Estimation Correlated
Random Effects Random Effects Random Effects Random Effects
Predicted Change for IOW -0.6333 -0.2514 -0.3951 -0.2198
The dependent variable is local public expenditure. All regressions include region and year dummies and are based on 2,050
observations. Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent
levels, respectively. The population variable has been divided by one million for expositional reasons.
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Figure 1: The strategic effect: The solid lines are the best-reply curves of the Isle of Wight
(steep line) and Southampton (flat line) to each other’s expenditure choice. Equilibrium
expenditure choices are at these lines’ intersection. Being connected with the mainland
would move the Isle of Wight’s best-reply curves to the dashed line. The horizontal
difference between that dashed line and the old equilibrium is the effect of separation on
the Isle of Wight’s expenditure choice identified in Section 4.
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Figure 2: The strategic effect (2): The solid lines are the best-reply curves of the Isle
of Wight (steep line) and Southampton (flat line) to each other’s expenditure choice.
Equilibrium expenditure choices are at these lines’ intersection. If the Isle of Wight was
connected with the mainland, this would move both best-reply curves to the dashed lines,
and the equilibrium to the intersection of these dashed lines. The equilibrium effect on
the Isle of Wight’s expenditure choice is almost identical with the horizontal difference
between that dashed line and the old equilibrium, the latter of which is the effect of
separation on the Isle of Wight’s expenditure choice identified in Section 4.
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